November 22, 2026

Supply Chain Hijack: How a Vulnerability in Optimizely Turned Trusted Scripts into Weapons for Financial Theft and iOS Exploitation

On November 16, a sophisticated supply chain attack exploited a critical vulnerability in the Optimizely Web Experimentation platform, transforming a trusted third-party script into a delivery vehicle for financial theft and mobile exploitation. For approximately 17 hours, a malicious loader was embedded within customer snippets served directly from Optimizely’s official Content Delivery Network (CDN). The campaign, which some security researchers have dubbed "OPTIMJACK," represents a significant escalation in the ongoing trend of targeting the web-based supply chains of major global enterprises.

The breach was detected and monitored by Report URI, a service that tracks the security headers and scripts executed by websites. Their analysis revealed that the malicious code was present in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets checked during the window of activity. These snippets belonged to 178 distinct organizations, a list that reads like a "who’s who" of the digital economy. High-profile victims included major media outlets like CNN and the BBC, technology giants Zoom, Salesforce, and GitLab, retail powerhouse IKEA, and financial institutions such as HSBC and Equifax. Even travel and entertainment entities like Air France-KLM, Peacock, and the crypto-hardware firm Ledger were caught in the crosshairs. Perhaps most telling was the fact that Optimizely’s own main website and login page were found to be carrying the malicious code, indicating the depth of the compromise within the vendor’s ecosystem.

How the Snippet Became the Weapon

To understand the mechanics of the OPTIMJACK campaign, one must first understand how modern web experimentation tools operate. Websites that utilize Optimizely to run A/B tests or personalize user experiences load a small piece of vendor-provided code known as a "snippet." This snippet is designed to be dynamic; it updates automatically whenever a customer modifies a setting in the Optimizely dashboard. A key feature of these snippets is a field called "Project JavaScript," which allows developers to run custom code to facilitate complex experiments.

The attacker behind this campaign successfully exploited a vulnerability within the Optimizely Web Experimentation interface to gain write access to this "Project JavaScript" field across numerous customer projects. By injecting a malicious loader into this field while leaving the rest of the snippet’s legitimate functions untouched, the attacker ensured that the malicious activity remained stealthy. Because the modified snippets were still being served from the legitimate cdn.optimizely.com domain under the vendor’s own valid SSL certificate, they bypassed most standard security filters. Even organizations that chose to serve the snippet from their own domains were not spared, as the content was still being pulled from the compromised project configuration.

The investigation into the delivery mechanism revealed that the attacker utilized three distinct variants of the loader to ensure maximum reach and persistence. The most common variant loaded a script called track.js directly from the attacker-controlled domain 1688360[.]cc. A second, more stealthy variant utilized Base64 encoding to hide the malicious domain, preventing it from being flagged by simple plaintext searches or basic automated scanners. The third and most sophisticated variant carried a full copy of the payload within the loader itself. This "fallback" payload was designed to execute if the primary domain was blocked by a firewall or blocklist, effectively defeating simple network-level defenses.

Security analysts at Cynet, who were among the first to flag browser connections to the attacker’s infrastructure, emphasized a critical distinction in this incident: delivery is not the same as a direct compromise of the website’s internal servers. A site serving the malicious code was not necessarily breached itself; rather, the malicious content lived within the Optimizely project and was delivered through the vendor’s CDN. This nuance is vital for incident response, as it shifts the focus from server-side forensics to client-side impact and third-party risk management.

What track.js Did in the Browser

Once the loader successfully executed in a user’s browser, it fetched the primary payload, track.js. According to a detailed payload analysis conducted by StepSecurity, the primary objective of this script was financial gain through two distinct methods: cryptocurrency theft and credit card skimming.