November 22, 2026

Supply Chain Hijack: How a Vulnerability in Optimizely Turned Trusted Scripts into Weapons for Financial Theft and iOS Exploitation

The cryptocurrency component of the attack was particularly refined. The script was designed to monitor the page text, input forms, links, and even the user’s clipboard for valid cryptocurrency wallet addresses. When a match was found, the script would replace the legitimate address with one belonging to the attacker. To avoid detection and ensure successful transfers, the script only swapped addresses that passed the specific checksum requirements of their respective blockchain chains. Furthermore, it utilized contextual awareness, only triggering the swap if the address was located near "payment words" such as "wallet," "deposit," or "send." This meant that a visitor attempting to copy a deposit address from a legitimate site like Ledger could unknowingly have the attacker’s address in their clipboard by the time they hit "paste" in their wallet application.

In addition to targeting crypto assets, track.js functioned as a traditional digital skimmer. It monitored checkout pages and payment forms to capture credit card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs. While Report URI was able to confirm the presence of this skimming logic, the total volume of exposed card data remains unknown. However, the financial impact was immediate; by 19:25 UTC on the day of the attack, the attacker’s cryptocurrency wallets had already received approximately $7,040 in stolen funds.

The iOS Exploit Chain

While the financial theft targeted all users, the OPTIMJACK campaign included a specific, high-stakes component aimed at Apple mobile devices. On iPhones and iPads, the malicious code would load a secondary script named boot.js from two .icu domains. This script functioned as a reconnaissance tool, reading the device’s iOS version to determine which exploit chain to deploy.

The exploits were delivered via a hidden iframe and utilized two previously documented exploit kits: "Coruna" and "DarkSword." These kits had been originally identified and analyzed by researchers at Google. The Coruna kit was used to target devices running iOS versions 13.0 through 17.2.1. The DarkSword kit was deployed against newer versions, specifically targeting iOS 18.4 through 18.7. Interestingly, the attacker also included a separate chain for "iOS 26," which currently only collects device details—a move that suggests either future-proofing or a misunderstanding of Apple’s versioning.

During a 44-minute window between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, the attacker escalated the intensity of the mobile campaign. During this period, a Coruna iframe was added to every visit originating from a device running iOS 18.6 or earlier. To increase the chances of a successful exploit, the affected pages were programmed to reload every 60 seconds.

Cynet researchers were able to retrieve the second stage of this exploit by emulating an iPhone browser. They described the result as "conditional delivery," noting that while the exploits were served to the browser, there have been no confirmed reports of successful full-device takeovers or persistent compromises of physical iPhones and iPads. Despite this, the intent to gain deep access to mobile devices marks this as a significantly more dangerous campaign than a standard web skimmer.