November 22, 2026

Supply Chain Hijack: How a Vulnerability in Optimizely Turned Trusted Scripts into Weapons for Financial Theft and iOS Exploitation

What Optimizely Has and Has Not Said

Following the discovery of the campaign, Optimizely issued a notice confirming that an attacker had "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" to inject malicious JavaScript into certain customer projects. The vendor stated that it has since fixed the underlying flaw, removed the malicious code, and taken steps to secure affected user accounts. Additionally, Optimizely claimed to have implemented new protections to prevent the delivery of unauthorized code in the future.

However, the vendor’s statement left several critical questions unanswered. The notice did not clarify the technical nature of the vulnerability, nor did it specify how many total projects were modified. Crucially, the timeline for when the fix was implemented remains vague, and there has been no confirmation regarding whether the attacker retains any residual access to the platform’s infrastructure.

A troubling development involving the software company Smartsheet highlighted these concerns. After Smartsheet’s snippet was initially cleaned, it was reportedly re-infected with an obfuscated version of the malicious loader. According to Report URI, this re-infection strongly suggests that the attacker still maintained access to the project even after the initial remediation attempt. This incident serves as a stark reminder that a single "clean" check of a vendor snippet is not definitive proof that a project has been fully secured, especially when the vendor remains silent on the details of the breach.

RedEye Assessment

The OPTIMJACK campaign serves as a textbook example of the "third-party script problem" at its most dangerous scale. By exploiting a single "write primitive" on the vendor side, an attacker was able to reach nearly 200 high-value organizations simultaneously. The delivery path, backed by a trusted CDN and a valid certificate, rendered traditional defenses like Content Security Policies (CSP) and domain allowlisting ineffective.

The operational maturity demonstrated by the attacker is particularly concerning. The use of obfuscated loader variants, blocklist-resistant payloads, and checksum-aware address swapping indicates a high level of technical proficiency. Furthermore, the attacker’s ability to pivot between financial skimming and sophisticated mobile exploitation shows a diverse set of objectives. Historical data suggests this was not an isolated incident; the same actor is believed to have run similar playbooks through other third-party services like Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media. This points to a deliberate and systematic hunt for writable primitives within the web script supply chain.

Report URI has noted that the actual number of affected organizations is likely higher than the 178 currently identified, as the data only reflects snippets that were active and checked during the 17-hour window. For organizations that utilize Optimizely Experimentation snippets, the window of exposure and the resulting regulatory obligations—particularly regarding the potential theft of credit card data—remain open questions. Until Optimizely provides a full disclosure of the root cause and confirms the total eviction of the attacker, the security community continues to view the platform with caution. RedEye remains available to help organizations assess their third-party script exposure and support the scoping of incidents related to this campaign.