November 22, 2026

CERT-UA Issues Urgent Warning Over Massive Compromise of Dahua Video Surveillance Systems via P2P Vulnerabilities

Attackers Hijack Dahua IP Cameras in Ukraine Using P2P Access and Auth Weaknesses

The implications of this flaw are profound. CERT-UA emphasized that many users operate under the false assumption that because their camera’s serial number is not publicly listed, the device is inherently secure from external discovery. The agency’s alert clarifies that any device with active P2P functionality is potentially at risk, even if it is positioned behind a firewall or lacks a direct public-facing IP address. The cloud relay acts as a bridge that bypasses traditional perimeter defenses, providing a direct path for attackers to reach internal hardware.

Once a device is identified via its serial number, the attackers must still overcome authentication barriers to gain control. The investigation reveals that this is achieved through several well-documented methods. In many cases, the intruders exploit the use of weak, default, or otherwise known passwords. However, more sophisticated efforts involve the exploitation of critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities found in outdated firmware versions. Specifically, the CERT-UA report points to CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045—two high-severity flaws that allow attackers to bypass the login process entirely on vulnerable Dahua hardware.

The broader context of these attacks suggests a coordinated and persistent effort to compromise surveillance networks. While CERT-UA has not explicitly named the parties responsible for the latest wave of infections, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) align closely with previous clusters of activity analyzed by cybersecurity firms such as Hunt.io. These campaigns have demonstrated a clear focus on surveillance infrastructure located within Ukraine and surrounding regions, often for the purpose of digital espionage.

One such campaign, attributed to a Russian-speaking operator, was found to have specifically singled out internet-exposed cameras in Ukraine. This actor utilized a combination of known vulnerabilities in both Dahua and Hikvision hardware, successfully compromising dozens of devices. A key component of this operation was the integration of "Ingram," a publicly available and potent webcam vulnerability scanner. By using Ingram, the operator could automate the process of finding vulnerable endpoints and deploying exploits, significantly increasing the efficiency of the campaign. This same threat actor is also believed to have expanded their scope to include TP-Link and MikroTik routers, targeting infrastructure across at least 15 European countries, including Poland, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

A second, even more expansive campaign, known as "Operation CameraSwarm," provides a chilling look at the potential scale of IoT (Internet of Things) exploitation. Attributed to a lone but highly capable threat actor, Operation CameraSwarm is estimated to have compromised over 14,530 Dahua IP cameras over a period of just five weeks in mid-2026. The attacker utilized a refined methodology: scanning for TCP port 37777—the default port for Dahua’s proprietary management and video streaming protocol—and then collecting serial numbers for P2P exploitation.